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Sudan: OHCHR Report Mentions ICC Role; UN SG Monthly Report Highlights "Sense of Impunity"; Negotiations on UN Troop Deployment; US Assistance to ICC Investigation; Analyses and Transcripts

25 May 2006

Dear All,

Please find below information on recent developments related to the Interna=
tional Criminal Court's investigation of Sudan:

(1) OHCHR THIRD PERIODIC REPORT ON HUMAN RIGHTS IN SUDAN: a new report, iss=
ued by the Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights (OHCHR) in coop=
eration with the UN Mission in the Sudan (UNMIS), argues that "Domestic cou=
rts and other mechanisms purporting to address gross violations of human ri=
ghts and international humanitarian law were superficial and inadequate. It=
appears that the ICC has a critical role to play in Darfur in bringing to =
justice State officials, and militia and rebel members alike."

(2) UN SECRETARY-GENERAL MONTHLY REPORT ON DARFUR: the latest monthly repor=
t of the UN Secretary-General on Darfur notes that "high-ranking State offi=
cials and leaders of armed groups and militia have not been held accountabl=
e for violence and crimes against civilians. [...] The lack of a good faith=
effort to investigate and hold individuals accountable for war crimes, cri=
mes against humanity and other offences reinforces a widely shared sense of=
impunity."

(3) NEGOTIATIONS ON UN TROOP DEPLOYMENT TO DARFUR: several articles about o=
ngoing negotiations regarding the possibility of UN troop deployment to Dar=
fur, which refer to the ICC's investigation. While the leader of the Sudan =
Liberation Movement Mani Arkoi Minawi has reaffirmed support for the Court'=
s investigation and troop deployment, another article explains that "One of=
the diplomats, who asked not to be identified, said it was not surprising =
that al-Bashir, whose government is being investigated by the International=
Criminal Court in The Hague for alleged war crimes, was still standing fir=
m against UN troops."

(4) US POSITION ON DARFUR AND ASSISTANCE TO ICC INVESTIGATION: (a) transcri=
pt of a House International Relations Committee hearing about Darfur during=
which Jendayi E. Frazer, Assistant Secretary of State for African Affairs,=
explained "the United States has said that we would provide assistance to =
the International Criminal Court if they asked for it. They haven't asked t=
he United States for assistance"; (b) Sudanese deputy foreign minister Ali =
Ahmed Karti, allegedly on the sealed list of 51 individuals handed to the I=
CC, failed to appear at a meeting with Ms. Frazer.

(5) ANALYSIS, ACADEMIC ARTICLE, AND RADIO INTERVIEW: (a) an assessment of t=
he context for the Court's investigation published in The Nation; (b) an ac=
ademic article which "documents and assesses the controversy, compromise, a=
nd, ultimately, consensus" that led to the adoption of Resolution 1593; and=
(c) an NPR interview in which John Prendergast noted that Sudanese governm=
ent officials "don't want the UN force to act as a Trojan horse to eventual=
ly execute any potential [ICC] indictments."

Please take note of the Coalition's policy on situations before the ICC (be=
low), which explicitly states that the CICC will NOT take a position on pot=
ential or pending situations before the Court. The Coalition, however, will=
continue to provide the most up-to-date information about the ICC.=20=20
=20
Warm Regards,
Esti Tambay
Information and Analysis Officer
Coalition for the International Criminal Court

**********************************************
A. OHCHR THIRD PERIODIC REPORT ON HUMAN RIGHTS IN SUDAN

1. Third periodic report of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human =
Rights on the human rights situation in the Sudan, in cooperation with the =
United Nations Mission in the Sudan (UNMIS) - 23 May 2006 http://www.ohchr.=
org/english/countries/sd/docs/3rdOHCHRApril06.pdf

"[...] 22. Two days after the Security Council passed resolution 1591 (2005=
) it passed resolution 1593 (2005), which referred the situation in Darfur =
to the Prosecutor of the International Criminal Court (ICC). The Government=
has repeatedly objected to this, claiming that Sudan is capable of bringin=
g justice to Darfur and that it would refuse to allow its nationals to be t=
ried in an international court. [...]

48. As the killing of civilians, raping of women and girls, and pillaging o=
f entire villages continued in Darfur, so too did a culture of impunity. Do=
mestic courts and other mechanisms purporting to address gross violations o=
f human rights and international humanitarian law were superficial and inad=
equate. It appears that the ICC has a critical role to play in Darfur in br=
inging to justice State officials, and militia and rebel members alike.

49. Despite the establishment of three new special courts in June and Novem=
ber 2005 which have the power to try serious Darfur conflict-related crimes=
, such crimes were not being seriously investigated or prosecuted. [...]

50. Many of the cases that came before the special courts were against civi=
lians involved in criminal activity such as armed robbery, unlawful possess=
ion of weapons, and murder. The issue of command responsibility and holding=
high-ranking officials accountable was effectively ignored. [...]

51. It is especially important for the courts in Darfur to hold commanders =
responsible, as they are the ones either ordering the violence or have the =
power to stop unlawful actions by their subordinates. Under international l=
aw, commanders and other superior officers not only must refrain from the c=
ommission of war crimes, but must also be held accountable for unlawful act=
ions that they order their subordinates to carry out. Moreover, commanders =
are criminally liable if they knew or should have known about crimes commis=
sioned by their subordinates and did not take sufficient measures to preven=
t or punish those crimes. The doctrine of command responsibility thus place=
s a high degree of responsibility and liability on, for example, the heads =
of the armed forces at the national and state levels, the heads of National=
Security at the national and state levels, the heads of Military Intellige=
nce at the national and state levels, and militia and rebel movement leader=
s. [...]

2. UN News Service, "Country Falling 'Far Short' On Many of Its Human Right=
s Commitments - UN Report" - 23 May 2006 http://www.un.org/apps/news/story.=
asp?NewsID=3D18576&Cr=3Dsudan&Cr1=3D=20

"Sudanese authorities are failing to uphold many of the human rights commit=
ments made last year, especially in the Darfur conflict, where the Governme=
nt is unable and unwilling to hold perpetrators of international crimes acc=
ountable, and the killing of civilians, raping of women and girls, and pill=
aging of entire villages continues, according to a United Nations report re=
leased today.

The report, issued by the Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights =
(OHCHR) in cooperation with the UN Mission in the Sudan (UNMIS) for Decembe=
r 2005 to April 2006, cited torture in detention facilities in Khartoum and=
Darfur as well as ill-treatment, detention, and harassment of human rights=
advocates throughout the country. [...]

It noted obstruction of the work of UNMIS human rights officers, urged refo=
rm of the Government's security apparatus to prevent it from committing hum=
an rights violations with impunity, and called on the authorities to contin=
ue initiatives they have taken to respect human rights. [...]

Regarding the western Darfur region, where a peace agreement was signed wit=
h one rebel faction in May, after the reporting period, OHCHR said the conf=
lict had reached a new level of violence, both in intensity and frequency. =
Human rights violations continued as the conflict escalated and there was a=
failure to protect civilians from attacks that included sexual as well as =
to hold people accountable.

"As the killing of civilians, raping of women and girls, and pillaging of e=
n-tire villages continued in Darfur, so too did a culture of impunity," the=
report said [...]. "Domestic courts and other mechanisms purporting to add=
ress gross violations of human rights and international humanitarian law we=
re superficial and inadequate. It appears that the ICC has a critical role =
to play in Darfur in bringing to justice State officials, and militia and r=
ebel members alike," it added, referring to the International Criminal Cour=
t. [...]"

Other Related Articles:
- Voice of America, "Sudan Falling Short on Human Rights Commitments": http=
://www.voanews.com/english/2006-05-23-voa73.cfm=20

**********************************************
B. UN SECRETARY-GENERAL MONTHLY REPORT ON DARFUR

1. Monthly Report of the Secretary-General on Darfur (S/2006/306)- 19 May 2=
006 http://daccessdds.un.org/doc/UNDOC/GEN/N06/354/47/PDF/N0635447.pdf?Open=
Element

=93[=85] 16. Meanwhile, high-ranking State officials and leaders of armed g=
roups and militia have not been held accountable for violence and crimes ag=
ainst civilians. Although the Special Criminal Court on the Events in Darfu=
r has been promoted by the Government as a key tool for bringing justice to=
the region, only one case of a large-scale attack typical of the conflict =
in Darfur has come before it: the attack on Tama in October 2005. The lack =
of a good faith effort to investigate and hold individuals accountable for =
war crimes, crimes against humanity and other offences reinforces a widely =
shared sense of impunity. [=85]=94

2. Associated Press (via Washington Post), Nick Wadhams, "Annan Accuses Sud=
an of Rights Violations" - 22 May 2006 http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn=
/content/article/2006/05/22/AR2006052201378_pf.html=20

"Sudan's government is violating international humanitarian law by barring =
fuel, food and relief aid to civilians in Darfur, U.N. Secretary-General Ko=
fi Annan said in a report released Monday.

The report to the U.N. Security Council described in frank terms how the pe=
ople of Darfur have been exposed to more violence in recent months, even as=
aid groups are cutting the programs because of insufficient funding. "Civi=
lians in Darfur continued to suffer the consequences of persistent violence=
and insecurity," Annan said in the report, which was sent to the Security =
Council and was to be made public in the coming days. [...]

Annan accused all parties in the conflict of also violating humanitarian la=
w with "totally unacceptable levels of violence and despicable attacks agai=
nst civilians," even as final negotiations for the peace deal took place. [=
...]

Annan also accused Sudan of failing to punish top state officials and armed=
leaders for attacks against civilians. That reinforces "a widely shared se=
nse of impunity," he said.

Sudan has opposed an investigation by the U.N. war crimes tribunal into atr=
ocities in Darfur, and instead set up its own investigation and a Special C=
ourt for Darfur. Annan said the Sudanese body has only heard one case so fa=
r, dating from October, 2005. [...]"

**********************************************
C. NEGOTIATIONS ON UN TROOP DEPLOYMENT TO DARFUR

1. Reuters (via Washington Post), Opheera McDoom, =93Sudan Wants Further Ta=
lks on UN Darfur Mission=94 =96 25 May 2006 http://www.washingtonpost.com/w=
p-dyn/content/article/2006/05/25/AR2006052500802.html=20

=93Sudan has not agreed to allow U.N. troops into Darfur, the foreign minis=
ter said on Thursday adding Khartoum wanted more discussions involving the =
United Nations and the African Union before allowing any such move. The sta=
tement came after three days of talks with high-level United Nations diplom=
ats in Khartoum who had hoped to persuade Sudan to allow an assessment team=
into Darfur to prepare for a U.N. peacekeeping mission there. [=85]

"We agreed on a three-way committee to meet and discuss this subject (U.N. =
transition)," Foreign Minister Lam Akol told reporters on Thursday. He adde=
d the AU would meet with the U.N. and the Sudanese government at a future u=
nspecified time to discuss the troop transition.

Akol also denied Sudan was in violation of international law by missing a S=
ecurity Council resolution to allow a technical team into Sudan by Tuesday =
night. [=85] The International Criminal Court is investigating alleged war =
crimes in the region.=94

2. Al-Sahafah (Sudan), =93Darfur rebel leader backs deployment of internati=
onal force in region=94 =96 22 May 2006 (link not available)

=93The leader of the [ex-rebel faction of the] Sudan Liberation Movement [S=
LM] Mani Arkoi Minawi has announced his support for the deployment of an in=
ternational force in Darfur under section seven allowing it to use force, p=
rotect civilians and pursue Darfur war criminals.=20=20

He reaffirmed support to the procedures by the International Criminal Court=
to punish those suspected of committing war crimes in the region and that =
it would not be affected by the Abuja agreement because it did not include =
an amnesty for those accused. [=85]=94

3. Newsday (New York), Tina Susman, =93Inside the Crisis; A flawed Peace Pa=
ct=94 =96 15 May 2006 http://www.newsday.com/news/nationworld/world/ny-wowo=
rl084742789may15,0,4445107.story?coll=3Dny-worldnews-print=20

=93[=85] Al-Bashir, however, has yet to approve the UN force, and in the pa=
st year, he has ignored UN resolutions demanding disarmament of the janjawe=
ed. Critics say that is not likely to change now. "We have seen more times =
than I can count the Sudanese saying one thing and doing exactly the opposi=
te," said Susan Rice of the Brookings Institution, who was President Bill C=
linton's assistant secretary of state for African affairs. "It is a perpetu=
al pattern." Rice and other diplomats who have dealt with al-Bashir, who ha=
s ruled Sudan since seizing power in a 1989 army coup, say he has a history=
of making false promises merely to appear accommodating and to get interna=
tional critics off his back. [=85]

Even if al-Bashir lets the United Nations enter, Western diplomats say it t=
akes at least six to nine months to organize such a mission. One of the dip=
lomats, who asked not to be identified, said it was not surprising that al-=
Bashir, whose government is being investigated by the International Crimina=
l Court in The Hague for alleged war crimes, was still standing firm agains=
t UN troops. "Rape is being used as a weapon, burning of villages is being =
used as a weapon, destroying commerce is being used as a weapon. All of tho=
se are against international law," said the diplomat, expressing doubts tha=
t al-Bashir suddenly would drop his resistance. "If I were al-Bashir, I wou=
ldn't want a bunch of international troops digging around Darfur looking fo=
r evidence of war crimes."=94

**********************************************
D. US POSITION ON DARFUR AND ASSISTANCE TO ICC INVESTIGATION

1. Transcript, Hearing of the US House International Relations Committee, =
=93Prospects for Peace in Darfur=94 =96 18 May 2006 Webcast available at ht=
tp://wwwc.house.gov/international_relations/fullhear.htm=20

Chaired by Rep. Christopher Smith (R-NJ), Witnesses: Jendayi E. Frazer, Ass=
istant Secretary, Bureau of African Affairs, Department of State; Lloyd O. =
Pierson, Assistant Administrator, Bureau for Africa, USAID=20

=93[=85] REP. EARL BLUMENAUER (D-OR): Thank you. [=85] I'm hopeful that w=
e can hear what we're going to do to try and change the nature and characte=
r of the Sudanese regime. Our policies of holding the International Crimin=
al Court at arm's level troubles me, because I would like to see the highes=
t levels of accountability in the Sudanese government before the Internatio=
nal Criminal Court. [...]

REP. THOMAS TANCREDO (R-CO): Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Just a couple of qu=
estions. First of all, could you give us an update on the status of the man=
y ongoing investigations of the International Criminal Court? I believe th=
at that is a very important part of the solution, should we ever reach one =
in the Sudan, that somebody actually be brought to justice. There is a cer=
tain degree of fear, I think, on the part of the people who are involved wi=
th the atrocities here that we may pursue them, and something like this mig=
ht be helpful. So I'd just be interested to know what's happening on that =
front. [=85]=20

MS. FRAZER: Thank you, Congressman. On the ongoing investigations for the =
International Criminal Court, as you know, the United States has said that =
we would provide assistance to the International Criminal Court if they ask=
ed for it. They haven't asked the United States for assistance. So we assu=
me that those investigations are going on and that they are, I guess, not n=
eeding our assistance at this time.

REP. TANCREDO: So we're not in communication? Even though there's no requ=
est for assistance, we don't communicate with them on that basis?

MS. FRAZER: They haven't -- as far as I know, Congressman, they haven't co=
me back to us and asked us for any type of assistance in terms of informati=
on on any particular individuals. We continue to work with the U.N. Securi=
ty Council under Resolution 1591 and 1593. And as you know, we've put sanct=
ions on four individuals. And I know that that investigation, with a high-=
level panel, was continuing. And we provide information. We provide names=
to that, to the U.N. Security Council.=20

But on the ICC, to my knowledge, Congressman, they haven't come to us and a=
sked us for any assistance. But I will try to find out more and see if the=
re's anything more that we can. But we stand ready to assist them.

REP. TANCREDO: I understand and I appreciate that. But if we could just g=
et some indication of where they are in the process --

MS. FRAZER: Right.

REP. TANCREDO: -- I would certainly like to know. [=85]=94

2. Washington Post, Glenn Kessler, =93Sudanese Official Is a No-Show at Sta=
te Department=94 =96 13 May 2006 http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/conte=
nt/article/2006/05/12/AR2006051201977.html

=93Assistant Secretary of State Jendayi E. Frazer planned to meet yesterday=
at the State Department with a top Sudanese official linked by human right=
s groups to the violence in Sudan's Darfur region that the Bush administrat=
ion has labeled as genocide. But the official, deputy foreign minister Ali =
Ahmed Karti, did not show up for the meeting, a State Department spokesman =
said. [=85]

Human rights groups say that Karti, though he now holds the title of state =
minister for foreign affairs, was the head of the Popular Defense Forces[=
=85]. Some experts have said they believe his name is on the secret list of=
51 names referred by the United Nations to the International Criminal Cour=
t for possible prosecution for war crimes. Another official believed to be =
on that list, intelligence chief Saleh Gosh, traveled to Washington last ye=
ar to meet with CIA officials.

Karti did not respond to a message left at the Sudanese Embassy. He has bee=
n a key public figure in rejecting the jurisdiction of the war-crimes court=
. "Our decision not to hand any Sudanese national for trial outside the cou=
ntry remains valid and has not changed," Karti was quoted as saying last Ju=
ne by the official Sudanese Media Center. [=85]=20

Sims said that Karti was granted a visa for a private visit to the United S=
tates and was a guest of former congressman Mark D. Siljander (R-Mich.). [=
=85] Siljander expressed surprise regarding the allegations about Karti's p=
ast. "I don't know anything about that," he said. "As far as I knew, he was=
in the cabinet." [=85]=94

**********************************************
E. ANALYSIS, EDITORIAL/COMMENTARIES, AND RADIO INTERVIEW

1. The Nation, Anja Tranovich, =93Seeking Justice Where There Is No Peace=
=94 =96 24 May 2006 http://www.thenation.com/doc/20060605/tranovich=20

=93On March 31, 2005, the UN Security Council voted to refer the ongoing at=
rocities in Darfur to the International Criminal Court (ICC), which was cre=
ated in 1998 to prosecute the gravest international crimes. That evening th=
e ICC, which had not yet held a trial, was handed a genocidal quagmire, a h=
ostile government and a near-mandate to prosecute.=20

International trials conducted in public seek to repair the power imbalance=
between criminal and victim and are a visible reactivation and reassurance=
of justice. The ICC hopes to achieve this in Sudan. But the new court is u=
ntested; no one knows how the trials will affect complex political situatio=
ns like the one unfolding in Darfur.=20

The ICC's first year in operation has shown that pursuing justice does not =
always create peace. Deirdre Clancy, a coordinator of the Darfur Consortium=
, put it this way: "The ICC is a huge idea and has a huge potential to have=
an impact, but it's a bunch of lawyers in The Hague negotiating an extraor=
dinarily complicated situation with security problems" and without much int=
ernational help. [=85]

The ICC was created to prosecute crimes such as those taking place in Darfu=
r, but building criminal cases amid ongoing violence is a daunting challeng=
e. There is inherent conflict in trying to deliver justice in an area witho=
ut peace; prioritizing either peace or justice poses political choices no o=
ne wants to make. The stakes for the new court are high.=20

"Most people here realize we are now under a magnifying glass," an ICC offi=
cial recently told a New York Times reporter. "It could make or break the i=
nstitution."=20

The ICC was never intended to operate in isolation. International forces se=
rve arrest warrants, and ICC personnel need access to the conflicted countr=
y to gather evidence. [=85]

One of the problems the ICC faces is that it relies on pressure from the in=
ternational community to help bring perpetrators of crimes against humanity=
to justice. The government in Khartoum won't cooperate with the ICC unless=
it is forced to do so. [=85]

Without a substantial UN or NATO intervention, it will be extremely difficu=
lt for the ICC to build compelling cases against high-level officials in a =
timely manner. Many observers have noted that one of the reasons the govern=
ment has been resistant to UN involvement is fear that UN forces will be us=
ed to serve arrest warrants from the ICC.=20

It is also possible that the ICC investigation has brought more violence to=
the conflict. [=85]

Meanwhile, those in Darfur wonder what has happened to The Hague. "The vict=
ims who must flee their homes only to see their wives and daughters raped a=
nd their husbands and sons shot favor the use of the International Criminal=
Court," said Refugees International worker Mamie Mutchler after visiting D=
arfur. "It seems only fair that their voices should weigh heavily in this d=
ebate." NGOs and human rights organizations in Sudan have suggested that th=
e public is losing faith in the ICC as they can't see any progress.=20

International officials are already starting to get restless. Louise Arbour=
, the UN High Commissioner for Human Rights, recently called upon the ICC "=
to more robustly and visibly discharge its mandate and the referral by the =
Security Council." But the ICC cannot fulfill its mandate with visibility, =
when any visibility at all is a security risk for witnesses, ICC staff and =
possibly the whole region. Sudan's minister of justice explained the sense =
of insecurity: "Many difficulties hold back efforts to track the criminals.=
... Even the witnesses run for their lives."=20

This is the context for the ICC's first cases. While the UN assembles a pea=
cekeeping mission that is unlikely to have the mandate or numbers to be suc=
cessful in Sudan, and as the United States and NATO continue to drag their =
feet, the ICC investigation slowly moves on, struggling to bring a measure =
of justice to areas the rest of the world won't touch.=94

2. Criminal Law Forum, Zachary Kaufman, =93Justice in Jeopardy: Accountabil=
ity for the Darfur Atrocities=94(Volume 16, Issue 4 =96 April 2006)=20

Published article in Criminal Law Forum accessible for the convenience of i=
nterested readers at http://sitemaker.umich.edu/backer/files/kaufman.2006.p=
df=20

=93[=85] This article documents and assesses the controversy, compromise, a=
nd, ultimately, consensus within the United Nations Security Council that r=
esulted in the Council=92s 31 March 2005 decision to adopt Resolution 1593,=
referring the situation in Darfur since 1 July 2002 to the Prosecutor of t=
he International Criminal Court. This article considers why the United Stat=
es government initially proposed the establishment of an alternative transi=
tional justice option for addressing Darfur, in the form of an ad hoc hybri=
d tribunal to be established in Arusha, Tanzania, that would be jointly adm=
inistered by the United Nations and the African Union and act as an extensi=
on of the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda. Second, given its opp=
osition to the International Criminal Court, the article examines why the U=
nited States government ultimately abstained from voting on, rather than ex=
ercise its veto, on Security Council Resolution 1593, thus enabling the Dar=
fur situation to be referred to the Court. Third, the article asks whether =
the advent of the International Criminal Court and the Security Council=92s=
referral of the Darfur situation necessarily preclude the pursuit of other=
transitional justice options in this case. Finally, the article questions =
the significance of the United Nations Security Council referral of the Dar=
fur situation to the International Criminal Court, and the political and le=
gal precedents this may set. [=85]

IV. CONCLUSION

The Darfur referral presents the opportunity to identify, try, and punish s=
uspected atrocity perpetrators, to document the history of, and responsibil=
ity for, the Darfur atrocities, to deter future atrocities, and to promote =
reconciliation among the people of Sudan. On the other hand, this referral =
may lead to significant disagreements among Sudan, the International Crimin=
al Court, and the United Nations Security Council about whether Sudan is co=
operating and, if not, what can and should occur to remedy that problem. If=
the International Criminal Court and the United Nations Security Council a=
re not successful in persuading Sudan to cooperate, the Court and the Counc=
il will be discredited, the victims of the Darfur atrocities will continue =
to suffer, and future perpetrators of atrocities in other non-party States =
will be undeterred. [=85]=94

3. National Public Radio (NPR), Fresh Air, Anchor Terry Goss, =93Nicholas K=
ristoff of The New York Times and John Prendergast of the International Cri=
sis Group discuss the continuing genocide crisis in Sudanese region of Darf=
ur in Africa=94 =96 18 May 2006
http://www.npr.org/templates/story/story.php?storyId=3D5415043=20

=93[=85] GROSS: John Prendergast, what are the odds, do you think that the =
government of Sudan will accept UN peacekeepers?

Mr. PRENDERGAST: Well, I think that they're fighting tooth and nail in orde=
r to maximize the concessions that they'll get down the road. I think event=
ually they will accede to the deployment of UN force. [=85] And so they don=
't want a very effective UN mission, so they're going to fight every aspect=
of it so that it is a limited mandate and the least number of troops with =
the least amount of firepower. And I think that you're going to see that.

The second thing, which they'll never say publicly, but what they really ar=
e aiming at when they oppose the UN so vociferously, is they simply don't w=
ant the UN force to act as a Trojan horse to eventually execute any potenti=
al indictments that the International Criminal Court might hand down in the=
context of its investigation of the crimes against humanity that have been=
committed principally by or at the orders, at the behest of and the orders=
of senior government of Sudan officials. So they don't want a scenario whe=
re there's 10 or 20,000 UN forces floating around Sudan. And, all of a sudd=
en, an indictment is issued for the defense minister or the head of intelli=
gence or even the vice president of the country, and then these forces are =
tasked by the Security Council to capture this guy and bring him to justice=
. That's the thing they're really afraid of.

GROSS: So you think they're going to try to negotiate some kind of deal whe=
re they're immune from that kind of prosecution?

Mr. PRENDERGAST: I don't think they can get the immunity from prosecution, =
what they probably could get is an understanding that the UN force that's d=
eployed specifically for Darfur and specifically for implementing the peace=
deal in southern Sudan would not be tasked with any other mandates such as=
apprehending suspects for the International Criminal Court. [=85]=94

**********************************************
CICC'S POLICY ON THE REFERRAL AND PROSECUTION OF SITUATIONS BEFORE THE ICC:
The Coalition for the ICC is not an organ of the Court. The CICC is an inde=
pendent NGO movement dedicated to the establishment of the International Cr=
iminal Court as a fair, effective, and independent international organizati=
on. The Coalition will continue to provide the most up-to-date information =
about the ICC and to help coordinate global action to effectively implement=
the Rome Statute of the ICC. The Coalition will also endeavor to respond t=
o basic queries and to raise awareness about the ICC's trigger mechanisms a=
nd procedures, as they develop. The Coalition as a whole, and its secretari=
at, do not endorse or promote specific investigations or prosecutions or ta=
ke a position on situations before the ICC. However, individual CICC member=
s may endorse referrals, provide legal and other support on investigations,=
or develop partnerships with local and other organizations in the course o=
f their efforts.
=20
Communications to the ICC can be sent to:
ICC
P.O. Box 19519
2500 CM The Hague
The Netherlands